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In Unpopular Government in the United States, Albert M. Kales delivers a sobering critique of the American political system. Written in the early 20th century, this work is strikingly relevant in today’s context of political disillusionment and systemic flaws. Kales meticulously examines how the very democratic principles meant to empower the electorate have paradoxically fostered a system of unpopular government controlled by a small elite—what he terms « politocrats. »
Kales begins his analysis by addressing the mid-19th century governance model, which worked well in frontier societies but became obsolete as the nation urbanized and grew more complex. He outlines how decentralization, the separation of powers, and frequent elections were designed to prevent tyranny. However, these mechanisms, while well-intentioned, have resulted in a fragmented and inefficient government structure. Instead of a truly democratic system, the decentralization of power has led to a chaotic system where political ignorance flourishes, giving rise to a new ruling class of professional politicians and political bosses.
The strength of Kales’ argument lies in his detailed account of how this « unpopular government » manifests itself. He emphasizes how the electorate is overwhelmed by the sheer number of elections and candidates they must consider, leading to widespread voter ignorance. This ignorance, Kales argues, allows a small group of political elites—who he refers to as « politocrats »—to manipulate the system for their own benefit. Through his analysis of the mechanics of political machines and vote-directing organizations, Kales unveils a system that places the politically ignorant majority at the mercy of the few who control the apparatus of elections.
One of Kales’ key contributions is his discussion of how political power has shifted from legal governance structures to extra-legal, informal networks. These networks, often comprising political bosses, wield real power behind the scenes, filling offices with loyalists and subverting the will of the electorate. Kales’ critique is not simply aimed at the politicians themselves but at the system that allows such a politocracy to thrive. He identifies this shift as a betrayal of the democratic ideals of government “of the people, by the people, and for the people.”
What makes Unpopular Government in the United States compelling is its balanced combination of historical analysis and pointed critique. Kales not only diagnoses the problem but also explores potential solutions, though his outlook is pessimistic. He questions whether the American electorate can ever regain true control over the government without radical reforms. His analysis of voter ignorance, and the role of party machines, still resonates today, echoing contemporary concerns about disenfranchisement, voter suppression, and the influence of money in politics.
Kales’ work is particularly relevant for those concerned with political reform and governance. It raises uncomfortable questions about whether democratic systems can be sustained when their foundational principles are so easily undermined. His detailed exploration of the mechanisms by which an unpopular government is maintained offers readers a lens through which to examine current political dynamics.
In Unpopular Government in the United States, Kales does more than criticize the past. He warns of a future in which democracy remains an illusion, manipulated by the few for their own gain, while the many remain politically disengaged and disenfranchised. It is a prescient work that invites readers to reflect on the health of their own political systems.